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COMMENT 
EFFICIENCY-WAGE THEORY AND LAW FIRM PAY 
Dongyu ‘Eddie’ Wang* 
Every first-year law student knows that Big Law pays $160,000 
a year. In fact, this number is likely the biggest incentive for 
applying in the minds of most law-school hopefuls. Taking New 
York City as an example, a quick look at Vault’s salary 
data1 reveals that, indeed, the large majority of New York firms 
with available salary data pay first-year associates exactly 
$160,000. 
An initial inquiry might be: why do all these firms, with very 
few deviations in either direction, pay their first-year associates 
exactly the same salary across the board? The most obvious 
answer might involve the marginal product of labor – each 
additional first-year associate increases the revenue of a firm by 
some amount, $X. If any firm pays the associate less than $X in 
order to increase their profits, a competitor will offer that attorney 
some salary closer to $X, thereby poaching the attorney while 
increasing its profits. This process repeats until eventually, all 
firms pay first-year attorneys their marginal product of labor, in 
this case, $160,000.2 
However, a closer look at the salary statistics reveals that, in 
fact, a few select firms offer first-year associates a salary greater 
than $160,000 – 8% of the over 100 firms surveyed pay over 
$160,000.3 Why would these firms pay more, up to $174,000? 
                                                   
*      J.D. Candidate, May 2013, University of Michigan Law School. 
1. See Law Salary Table, VAULT.COM, 
http://careerinsider.vault.com/wps/myportal/careerinsider/salaries/lawSalary?industryId=28
&search_result_id=363&cityId=2380 (last visited Oct. 8, 2011). 
2. See generally, Arthur O’Sullivan & Steven M. Sheffrin, Economics: Principles in 
Action 108 (2d ed. 2003). 
3. See Law Salary Table, supra note 1. 
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One economic theory that might explain this phenomenon is 
the efficiency wage hypothesis. The efficiency wage hypothesis 
predicts that firms will pay employees more than the competitive 
market wage in order to incentivize them to work harder. In a 
stylized world where all firms are offering $160,000, a first-year 
associate has no incentive to work diligently. If he gets fired, he 
can pursue a job at another firm for the same wage. However, if 
one firm pays more, $170,000, for example, then that firm’s 
employees have an extra incentive to work harder – if they are 
fired, they can only find work at firms paying a lower wage.4 
Other factors that might encourage firms to pay more than 
the market wage include talent adverse selection and the 
reduction of search costs – firm offering higher wages will attract 
a greater number of applicants, giving the firm more power to 
choose the most talented and able candidates. The incentives to 
work hard also lessen the likelihood that attorneys will leave the 
firm. This reduces the costs the firm will incur to search for 
replacements. 
Back to the real world, if we look at the firms that actually pay 
over $160,000, we can see these firms are indeed the cream of the 
crop – including big names such as Cleary Gottlieb Steen & 
Hamilton, Cravath Swaine & Moore, Skadden Arps Slate Meagher 
& Flom, and Wachtell Lipton Rosen & Katz. In fact, all but one of 
the firms on this list are part of Vault’s top 25 most prestigious 
firms in New York City. 
This is, of course, not the entire story, but it does shed some 
light on the debate over whether or not Big Law lawyers are 
overpaid. $174,000 plus bonuses for a first-year associate may 
seem like a lot of money, but perhaps that’s what it takes in order 
to get the most talented law school graduates. 
  
                                                   
4. For a technical model of the efficiency wage theory, see, e.g., Carl Shapiro & 
Joseph E. Stiglitz, Equilibrium Unemployment as a Worker Discipline Device, 74.3 AM. 
ECON. REV. 433-44 (1984). 
